The Soros Campaign Deepened Antisemitism — Government Propaganda Played a Key Role
By Dóra Ónody-Molnár, Jelen magazine
This article originally appeared in Hungarian on Jelen magazine, you can read it here.
The old stereotype that extreme right-wingers are large, white, working-class men is far off the mark, sociologist Anikó Félix says. Félix, who is the executive director of the new Jewish historical and cultural research institute named after the Hungarian scholar Ignác Goldziher, and also a researcher at the institute and an adviser to the World Jewish Congress, was talking to Jelen (Present) magazine about her recent report on antisemitic acts and about a survey by Median market research company measuring antisemitic attitudes.
Editorial credit: Peter Csaszar / Shutterstock.com
Why was the research institute set up?
It was thought important that the country with the largest Jewish community in Central-Eastern Europe should have a research institute that builds on the incredibly rich cultural and historical traditions of Hungarian Jewry. The three bodies that set up the institute — the Federation of Hungarian Jewish Communities (Mazsihisz), the Budapest University of Jewish Studies (Rabbiképző) and the Jewish Museum and Archives — are themselves a part of this heritage and are able to provide the right environment for an internationally recognised research centre. The institute’s interdisciplinary nature means that the historical focus of our work also embraces the sociological, political and philosophical context. Thus we aim to explore all aspects of the relationship between Hungarian Jewry and the wider Hungarian society, and between Jews and other groups that could be important and deserve further analysis.
What period will you be examining?
It runs broadly speaking from the 19th century through to the present day.
And why was it set up now?
The idea was formulated some time ago, but there were numerous obstacles to its realisation. I have been involved in the preparatory work for the past 18 months, and several pieces of research have already begun in this period.
Could you give an example?
We are working on a three-year project led by Haifa University. I am leading the Hungarian research. We are examining the discourse concerning the Holocaust in five countries: Hungary, Germany, Poland, Spain and Great Britain. This includes the political discourse about the Holocaust, how it is connected to other themes and finally by what means — and how effectively — the Holocaust is taught in schools.
So, for example, are you looking at how this subject is presented in Hungarian textbooks?
Naturally. In terms of both education and the broader political discourse, given the scandal that arose over the current politics of historical memory and how it pertains to the national curriculum.
The research included the “black-belt” antisemite Mihály Takaró [who has actively promoted far right authors in the National Curriculum]. Clearly the research offers a kind of mirror to the wider society, but what is its real purpose?
The research shows the parallels and differences between the countries, which is interesting in itself. In the final phase of the work we are trying to put forward recommendations for how to change education policy and how to influence public discourse in this regard.
How will you share your work with the wider public?
We are planning a series of conferences on different periods of the 19th and 20th centuries examining the position and role of Jewish communities. The first one is “Trianon and the Jews”, on June 28. It will be [was] live-streamed on our Facebook page.
The Federation of Hungarian Jewish Communities has prepared its bi-annual report, which is linked to Medián’s regular antisemitism survey. What do these show?
The report summarises and analyses the antisemitic incidents that the Federation’s security service collected in 2019 and 2020, while Medián conducted an attitude survey on a representative sample of the population. We will release these together as they complement each other and present a quite complex overall picture.
What sort of things are recorded in the report?
Physical assaults, threats, vandalism, antisemitic hate speech and antisemitic conspiracy theories, as well as antisemitism in public life. We are adopting a wide-ranging approach so that we can get a fuller understanding of what is happening in Hungary. For while physical assaults are rare…
… a fact that the government is very proud of…
In Western Europe it is a few clearly demarcated groups that commit physical attacks on Jews, while most of the broader society avoids such acts. In Hungary there are fewer physical attacks but antisemitism is more perceptible in the political discourse and at the level of attitudes. In comparison to previous years, there has been a rise in the occurrence of hate speech and conspiracy theories.
Do these reach the courts?
They are reported, but typically are in the “unknown perpetrator” category, which defines the success of the investigation, or rather the lack of success.
Where are such crimes found?
Antisemitic conspiracy theories, hate speech and public antisemitism are most often found online, in verbal attacks, or in public incidents. There are far fewer cases of physical attacks. One subcategory of hate speech is offline incidents, when, say, someone draws a swastika or a Star of David on a public monument or a hoarding. Another is when a public figure is abused, and a third is when the perpetrator is also a public figure. A considerable number of hate speech incidents have been connected to the Our Homeland Movement (Mi Hazánk Mozgalom) in the past couple of years.
Fewer have been connected to Jobbik? [do we need to explain Jobbik? The biggest political party on the far right that has been moving towards the centre]
Two specific incidents were linked to Jobbik in the 2019-2020 report, relating to two candidates standing in the elections, László Bíró and Gergely Kulcsár. These did not qualify as antisemitic crimes in their own right, but they contributed to the normalisation of antisemitism in the public domain.
Which groups most typically display antisemitism?
Primarily the government media and figures close to the government when they normalise contemporary or “historical” far right figures. We have mentioned Mihály Takaró’s role, and how certain problematic historical figures are treated in school text books. [She has only mentioned them in passing.] It is worth mentioning contemporary figures promoted or honoured by the government — in the past two years people I am thinking of people such as Ernő Raffay and Beatrix Siklósi. In terms of the historical narrative Our Homeland and the government often focus on the same events, to which Our Homeland gives an antisemitic interpretation. For example, the 1919 Hungarian Soviet Republic or Trianon, where they refer to the alleged or real Jewish background of the enemy, oppressors or perpetrators. An example in the report of how these are woven together is that Ernő Raffay spoke at an Our Homeland event, but in the same year he received an award from the government.
The fact that the number of online antisemitic acts has increased is assumed to be mainly a result of the pandemic, which has been a good breeding ground for antisemitism.
The lockdown has been a double-edged sword. Physical attacks have decreased all round the world but in many cases the pent-up emotions found a release on the web. New forms of online assault were developed, such as zoombombing, which was used to disrupt the online operation of “hostile organisations” — Jewish institutions, programmes and schools — flooding them with antisemitic or pornographic material. Everywhere the frustration of this period led to a search for scapegoats, and the pandemic itself offered ammunition for conspiracy theories. Often the views of virus-sceptic or anti-vax groups contained the tropes of antisemitic conspiracy theories. These produced new fault lines in societies, reaping success not just in far right circles, including groups that would heartily protest if they were accused of antisemitism.
Was it difficult for you as a researcher that the public broadcaster began to guard itself against such content?
It was, but we had the means to capture such phenomena on screen. What the service providers can achieve by doing this is another matter. Antisemitic organisations will simply move to other platforms — they are in circulation, that is their most important communication medium. Telegram is the far right’s Canaan, where there is no restriction on content whatsoever. I am not convinced that blocking such organisations is the right tool to use against antisemitism.
Is antisemitism generally on the rise in society?
The Medián report indicated that we are talking here about a huge one third of society. This level was reached between 2005 and 2011 at a time when elements in the country were becoming increasing radicalised. The acceptance of conspiracy theories has risen, as if in this increasingly uncertain world there is a growing need for such “explanatory” theories. The number of Holocaust relativisers was also relatively high, rising to one fifth of society.
Are there any variations by age group?
The research suggested there were not. The only socio-demographic characteristic that can be applied to the members of these groups is that fewer of them have degrees.
This is true of those who commit antisemitic acts, too. If we broaden our focus and look at those on the far right more generally, rather than just at those perpetrators, we find that the old stereotype that extreme right-wingers are large, white, working-class men is a far from reality. Recently there has been a sense that the right wing is in a development phase. You can see their search for the way forward in their focus on body conditioning— that if “anything happens”, they are physically ready for the big challenge.
What forms does this search take?
It is apparent in the way they relate to historical events. They are trying to develop narratives and build an identity and a community around themselves. One of the oldest examples is the hero narrative relating to the 1945 Buda Castle break-out [by German and Hungarian troops at the end of the Soviet siege of Budapest] and Day of Honour which has been built around this. This has become an identification point for the far right. I think that banning such events reduces the symptoms but does not tackle the cause. It would be better to offer an alternative, raising up alternative narratives.
What are the characteristics of antisemitism in Hungary today?
What comes out of Medián and similar earlier surveys is that antisemitism is linked to homophobic and authoritarian views — they go hand in hand. At the level of Hungarian political discourse today this takes a different shape. The government accuses the opposition of being antisemitic because it is joining forces with Jobbik, while the opposition points the finger at the government for events it has held under its politics of memory and its Soros campaign. So there is no uniform view on what we define as antisemitism.
Was the Soros campaign antisemitic?
The campaign has to be seen in context — it is one thing to criticise George Soros in the US and another thing to do so in Hungary, where over a long period in the 1990s the far right party MIÉP used Soros in its antisemitic campaigns, whether against bankers, big business and behind-the-scenes control. There is great tradition of coded language in this region, and these expressions assume an antisemitic content even if one might not think they do.
Previous surveys reckoned that the government did not deepen antisemitism.
But there can be an after-effect. There was a question in the Medián survey that listed public figures from the past and present, among them four Jews. These included George Soros and the writer Imre Kertész. More people in the survey thought that Soros was Jewish — 57 percent — than Kertész. In particular it is very revealing, that while only 3 percent of those questioned identified Soros as Jewish of their own accord [ in response to the question “what comes to your mind when you hear the name George Soros”] — ie, people do not automatically think like that — it only takes a little push to set them off down that road.
Is the left wing in Hungary is displaying a phenomenon that is found in Western Europe — that in its criticism of Israel the progressive left wing is reviving antisemitic tropes?
It is less common in Hungary to find antisemitism packaged up with criticism of Israel. Antisemitism here is mainly associated with the right wing, which is interesting as in Western Europe the far right political parties present themselves today as being friends of Israel, while here they are anti-Israel. The Hungarian government’s pro-Israel stand is a new phenomenon, and in the long run it may have a positive effect. At present surveys suggest that Hungarian society is generally neutral with regard to Israel.
